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污水處理PPP項目政府補償決策研究
 陳述1,2,袁越1,席炎1,粱霄1
(1.三峽大學 水利與環境學院,湖北 宜昌 443002; 2.三峽大學 政府與社會資本合作研究中心,湖北 宜昌 443002)
Government’s Compensation Decision for PublicPrivate Partnership Projects of Wastewater Treatment
 CHEN Shu1,2, YUAN Yue1, XI Yan1, LIANG Xiao1
(1.College of Hydraulic & Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China; 2.Research Center for PublicPrivate Partnership, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China)

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人民黃河
  2019,Vol. 41(9): 92
  水環境與水生態
污水處理PPP項目政府補償決策研究
 陳述1,2,袁越1,席炎1,粱霄1
(1.三峽大學 水利與環境學院,湖北 宜昌 443002; 2.三峽大學 政府與社會資本合作研究中心,湖北 宜昌 443002))
doi:
Government’s Compensation Decision for PublicPrivate Partnership Projects of Wastewater Treatment
 CHEN Shu1,2, YUAN Yue1, XI Yan1, LIANG Xiao1
(1.College of Hydraulic & Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China; 2.Research Center for PublicPrivate Partnership, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China)
全文: PDF (2.49MB)
摘要: 科學合理的補償機制是吸引社會資本參與污水處理PPP項目的關鍵,針對污水處理PPP項目特性,采用“有無對比法”量化經濟、社會、環境外部效益,建立了污水處理PPP項目政府補償決策Stackelberg模型,并求解博弈均衡點。實例應用表明:某污水處理PPP項目產生的外部效益為0.922億元,政府年運營補償基準值為0.64億元,通過適當增加前期運營補償額既可以促使社會資本提高投資額,又可以使社會資本盡快實現盈虧平衡。Stackelberg博弈均衡解中,社會資本投資額高于社會資本獨立決策時的最優投資額,低于政府獨立決策時期望的社會資本投資額;運營補償基準值高于政府獨立決策時的運營補償基準值;社會資本凈現值隨年運營補償基準值增大而不斷增大,政府凈現值隨運營補償基準值增大先增大后減小;在社會資本追求自身利益最大化條件約束下,政府前期年運營補償額高于政府獨立決策時年運營補償額,盈虧平衡年份提前。
關鍵詞:
Abstract: Scientific and reasonable compensation mechanism is the key to attract social capital to participate in sewage treatment PPP projects. According to the characteristics of sewage treatment PPP projects, the Stackelberg model of government compensation decisionmaking for sewage treatment PPP projects was established by using the method of “with or without comparison” to quantify the external economic, social and environmental benefits, and the game equilibrium point was solved. The practical application shows that the external benefit of a sewage treatment PPP project is 922 million Yuan and the annual operation compensation benchmark value of the government is 640 million Yuan. By properly increasing the preoperation compensation amount, social capital can not only increase the investment in construction, but also achieve the breakeven of social capital as soon as possible. In Stackelberg game equilibrium solution, the amount of social capital investment is higher than the optimal amount of social capital investment in independent decisionmaking, lower than the expected amount of social capital investment in independent decisionmaking period of government; the benchmark value of operation compensation is higher than the benchmark value of operation compensation in independent decisionmaking period of government; the net present value of social capital keeps increasing with the increase of annual operation compensation benchmark value. The net present value of the government increases first and then decreases with the increase of the benchmark value of operation compensation; under the restriction of social capital’s pursuit of maximizing its own interests, the annual operation compensation of the government in the earlier period is higher than that of the government in the independent decisionmaking period and the year of profitloss balance is ahead of schedule.
Key words: PPP project; wastewater treatment; government’s compensation; external benefits; Stackelberg model
收稿日期:
基金資助: 國家自然科學基金資助項目(51609128);湖北省技術創新專項軟科學研究項目(2019ADC068)
作者簡介: 陳述(1986—),男,湖北英山人,副教授,博士,研究方向為PPP項目管理
江苏7位数开奖历史